I’ve been reading a great book about World War II military
intelligence -- one of those nonfiction books that makes you think no
fiction writer will ever be up to the task. I was enjoying it as
“pure” history (is there any such thing?), but today realized that it
is incredibly useful for thinking about recent news regarding
Ahmad
Chalabi and Iranian intelligence, and the search for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq generally.
The book is The Deceivers: Allied
Military Deception in the Second World War, by Thaddeus Holt
(just published). The author, a former Deputy Under Secretary of the
Army, describes with precision and wit how first the British and then
the American military learned to deceive Germany and Japan regarding
the Allied force strength and intentions. It’s the sort of book I
would send to a Hollywood producer buddy if only Hollywood had any
shot at not screwing it up (*ahem*).
Holt describes how the British “A” Force, the group charged with
deception, undertook to cause German forces to take actions favorable
to the British:
The object of a deception is not to induce the enemy
commander to think something, but to induce him to do
something: To act as you want him to act ... Your target is the
mind of the enemy commander. You must judge what estimate of the
situation given to him by his intelligence services will induce him to
act as you wish. Your customers are the enemy intelligence
services. You need to know how they operate, and what information
given to them will induce them to give their commander the estimate of
the situation that will cause him to act as you want him to
act.
(p. 50.) The early learning process, in 1940-41, showed the British
deceivers how to construct a “story” that would produce the desired effect:
[T]he most effective deception is one that confirms what
the enemy already wants to believe; ... [A deception] “story” can be
based on an operation that had been considered and
rejected[.]
(p. 51.) I was particularly struck when reading the chapter on
“The Customers” -- that is, the people to whom deceptive stories were
passed, in order to induce a desired action:
Intelligence people in all wars tend by nature to inflate
order of battle figures [to play it safe]; savvy commanders know
this and make allowances for it.
And:
“Deception can never be effective either in love or in
war,” Sir Michael Howard has well said, “unless there is a certain
willingness to be deceived.”
(Both quotes from p. 101.)
How does all this apply to Iraq, WMD, Chalabi, and Iran? Well, we
know that the Bush Administration has cited WMD as the key reason to
go to war in Iraq, and that to date no such weapons have been found in
the country. Suppose for a moment -- and I think this is a reasonable
supposition, supported by Bob Woodward’s recent Plan of Attack and other sources -- that
the Bush Administration really believed WMD existed in Iraq. Suppose
also -- again, I think this is more than reasonable at this point --
that their belief was completely mistaken. The question that follows
for me is, how did they make such a mistake?
Assume that no one in the US willfully made up the WMD story
themselves in order to accomplish other goals (a complete contrivance
is a remote possibility, but I suspect by now one of the originators
would have leaked). Did the intelligence community provide the
Administration with enough supporting material to make the case
plausible, both to themselves and others? (Certainly seems that way.)
Was it really just the Administration pushing the intelligence
community for the answer they wanted -- did they effectively lie to
themselves by forcing bad interpretations of innocuous data? Or did
the inclination in the Administration towards action against Hussein
meet with a deliberate attempt to deceive the US into action?
Holt’s book, of course, gives me no way to say one way or another
-- but what it does show, I believe, is that all the conditions
necessary for a deception existed:
- There was a “story” -- that Hussein had WMD;
- The furtherance of the story accomplished a clear object, the
removal of Hussein from power;
- The story was based on real plans that Hussein seems to have
abandoned;
- The story was bolstered by information given or suggested to the
US intelligence agencies (Holt points out that deception is most
useful when military forces are not in direct engagement but instead
are planning for action);
- The story matched what the Bush Administration already wanted
to believe about Iraq and Hussein;
- The story was built up over a long period of time; and
- The story was sufficient to prompt the US to take action.
If this was a planned deception -- and again, Holt makes it clear
that much smaller-scale deceptions required tremendous planning
efforts -- I wonder who planned it. Chalabi and his organization?
That seems like it should not have succeeded since their interests
were so clear and would have been so clear to everyone involved; plus,
they seem unlikely to have been able to provide any logistical or
physical support for the claims of defectors. Iran? I would have to
say Iran is the primary suspect if a planned deception actually
occurred: their interest in removing Hussein is clear; today’s Times
article
on the topic calls the Iranian spy service “one of the most sophisticated
in the Middle East”; and they clearly had contact with Chalabi and
could have fed him notional evidence to pass to the US. Others might
suggest Israel, which would seem to have the sophistication but not, I
suspect, any better access to Iraq than the US itself. I’d doubt even
a very strong Israeli desire for Hussein’s removal could have produced
this result by these means.
A few things don’t quite add up, here, suggesting that I’m taking
my enjoyment of the book too far. If Iran was running a deception,
and the US was reading Iranian intelligence traffic (see the NYT
article), why didn’t we catch on earlier -- were they that
careful? Why was Chalabi deliberately blown, and why did he tell the
Iranians what he is accused of telling them? And finally -- why is
this news coming out at all? Does the Bush Administration really hope
the American public will forgive them for their mistaken war because
they were lied to about WMD by Chalabi? That seems impossibly naive
-- Mayberry Machiavellianism indeed!
In any case, the one thing more and more apparent to me, as I read
further in Holt’s book, is that the Bush Administration decision-makers
do not fall into the category of “savvy commanders” who make
allowances for inflated intelligence estimates. It seems instead to
have been the opposite -- that the intelligence estimates were not
nearly enough to support the war effort, and they went ahead
regardless. If they were systematically deceived, how much the
deceivers must have celebrated at the enormity of their success, and
the paltry effort needed to produce the action they desired.
Holt, by the way, is speaking this Friday in New
York at City University of New York. I’d love to hear a report of
what he says -- it would be interesting to see if he addresses this topic.
[A long first post! The next will be shorter and more amusing.]
-Marc